Monday, November 19, 2012

WHERE EVERYBODY KNOWS YOUR NAME...

Most contractors are generally aware their license with the California Contractors State License Board must be in the name of the legal entity doing the contracting.  The importance of this rule was recently highlighted, however, by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corporation v. Paul Bardos (2012) case no. E051769, issued for publication on November 8, 2012.

Twenty-Nine Palms (“Palms”) was a tribal corporation, who hired Cadmus Construction Co. (“Cadmus”), a sole proprietorship wholly owned by Paul Bardos (“Bardos”), to construct a temporary access road and parking lot for the Palms’ casino.  The underlying lawsuit filed by Palms in essence sought to recover all funds paid to Cadmus pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 7031, alleging Cadmus was unlicensed.  Section 7031 bars unlicensed contractors from bringing actions in state court to recover compensation, and further provides that anyone who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action to recover all compensation paid to that contractor.  This is commonly referred to as “disgorgement.”

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Palms, ordering Cadmus to disgorge the entire contract balance of $751,995.  Ouch.

By way of background, Palms contracted with Cadmus in March 2007.  Bardos was the 100% owner of Cadmus, and alleged Cadmus was operating under the Bardos Construction, Inc. (“BCI”) license issued in 1987, for which Bardos was the RMO.

Cadmus applied for its contractor’s license on June 25, 2007, in an application signed by Bardos.  Under the contract between Cadmus and Palms, construction  was completed by May 2007, almost one month before Cadmus applied for its own license.  It was undisputed that Palms knew Cadmus was a sole proprietorship operated by Bardos, and BCI had done inspection and construction work for Palms in the past. 

Cadmus argued civil regulatory laws do not apply on tribal lands, and therefore, Section 7031 (the licensing statute), as a regulatory licensing rule, would not apply and require the contractor to be licensed.  Cadmus also argued there was an issue of fact to be determined by a jury as to whether Palms waived the licensing requirement, which it could do pursuant to its sovereign immunity.  Cadmus argued that because Palms had performed an extensive background check on Bardos, including a review of BCI’s contractor’s license status, it should be barred from recovering disgorged funds due to the doctrine of unclean hands:  Palms knew of BCI’s dual role.  Finally, even if the Court determined Cadmus was unlicensed, it argued it had “substantially complied” with the licensing requirement, a statutory defense to technical noncompliance. 

The Court ruled the unlicensed contractor statute (Section 7031) was enforceable on tribal lands because Cadmus was not entitled to assert Palms’ sovereign immunity for them.  The sovereign immunity defense is reserved for the tribe and its entities; “thus, if a tribe or a tribal entity seeks to sue a non-tribal entity in state court, then the non-tribal entity cannot assert a sovereign immunity defense.”  (Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corporation v. Paul Bardo, supra, at p. 15.)  The sovereign immunity defense belongs only to the tribe.  Because the Court held Cadmus was not entitled to assert the sovereign immunity defense, it did not embark upon an analysis of the merits of Cadmus’ civil regulatory argument.

As to Cadmus’ licensure, Cadmus argued it had always been a sole proprietorship, and Bardos had always been 100% owner.  Bardos asserted his role as the RMO of BCI made BCI the equivalent of an individual license for Bardos, and thus, permitted Bardos to work under Cadmus’ name.  The problem with Cadmus’ argument is that BCI, as a corporation, is a separate legal entity from Bardos and Cadmus.  Cadmus, in an intriguing argument raised for the first time on appeal, contended the corporate identity of BCI should be disregarded via the alter ego doctrine or “piercing the corporate veil” (traditionally, an argument used as a sword by a plaintiff, not a shield by the defendant).  The Court declined to extend this argument to Cadmus’ benefit, holding the alter ego doctrine was not created to circumvent regulatory requirements.

Lastly, Cadmus contended that if it were not properly licensed, then there was evidence Cadmus fulfilled the substantial compliance requirements.  Section 7031(e) allows a court to find there has been “substantial compliance with licensure requirements…if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.”  The Court disagreed, again based upon the separate and distinct corporate status of BCI, the fact Cadmus had never had a license issued in its name, and Bardos’ admission he knew Cadmus was not licensed when he filed the license application in March 2007. 

So, to make a long story short, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court ruling, and Cadmus had to learn a very costly lesson about California’s licensing statutes.  Profit from Cadmus’ mistake, and don’t make the same mistake yourself.  It is a relatively simple, straight-forward process to ensure your license is properly in the name of your business/contracting entity.   

Questions?  Concerns about how to protect your business interests?  Comment, or send me an email.  I’m here to help! 

 
Nothing in this blog is intended to create an attorney-client relationship.  This article is intended to provide a general overview of the current status of the law for informational purposes only, and is not intended to constitute, or serve as a substitute for, a professional legal consultation.  Laws change every day; please consult an attorney regarding the current status of the law, and how the law affects your specific circumstances. Thank you.

 

Thursday, October 4, 2012

October is National Employment Disabilties Awareness Month!

October is National Employment Disabilities Month.  If you are an employer, now is the perfect time to review your workplace policies to ensure compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, commonly referred to as the ADA.

Generally speaking, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals who also happen to have disabilities.  Employers are required to ensure conditions and privileges of employment are nondiscriminatory, and must avoid discriminatory hiring practices, termination decisions, or the appearance of discrimination in any other employment matter, such as work assignments or promotions.

Additionally, the ADA imposes a duty upon employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for disabled employees.  As an employer, it is important to proactively address the concerns of disabled employees, and take employees' requests for accommodation seriously.

If you have questions about your duties and responsibilities under the ADA, or other state and local laws impacting disability, think about giving Mollenkopf Law Group a call. 

Also, the National Federation of Independent Business offers a really good and free Employment Law Handbook, with basic information on employer obligations under the ADA and other federal statutes.  Send me an email, and I can send you a link to download the handbook.


Nothing in this blog is intended to create an attorney-client relationship.  This article is intended to provide a general overview of the current status of the law for informational purposes only, and is not intended to constitute, or serve as a substitute for, a professional legal consultation.  Laws change every day; please consult an attorney regarding the current status of the law, and how the law affects your specific circumstances. Thank you.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Kristine Mollenkopf, Fellow, Litigation Counsel of America


Kristine Mollenkopf of Mollenkopf Law Group in Santa Maria, California has been welcomed as a Fellow of Litigation Counsel of America.  LCA is an invitation-only trial lawyer honorary society, limited to 3,500 Fellows, representing less than one-half of one percent of American lawyers.  The purposes of the LCA include recognition of deserving, experienced, and highly qualified lawyers, provision of outlets for scholarly authorship of legal articles on trial and litigation practice, promotion of superior advocacy and ethical standards in the practice of law, community involvement by its membership, and the advancement of a superior judiciary.

 
Fellows are selected and invited into Fellowship after being evaluated on effectiveness and accomplishment in litigation and trial work, along with ethical reputation.  The selection process is a combination of Fellow input, internal research nominations by Fellows, attorney opinions, evaluation of client selection of counsel, limited input from active and retired judges, and reviews of acknowledgement and recognition by other peer reviewing sources and associations.  The criteria used for selection is not based purely on the number of cases tried, or the notoriety usually associated with frequent court appearances, but also effectiveness in the area of a particular lawyer’s expertise.  By using this approach, the LCA has developed its membership with a breadth of experience in litigation that makes its Fellows one of the most well-rounded practice groups among any legal professional society, and provides recognition and opportunities to those deserving the designation “Fellow, Litigation Counsel of America.”

Monday, August 27, 2012

Have you heard about California's Proposition 37?


California’s Proposition 37, on an already daunting ballot this November, is described as a consumer “right to know” measure, but has broad-reaching effects.  If Proposition 37 passes, California would become the first state in the nation to require new labels on a host of food products commonly found on grocery store shelves, from breakfast cereals to soda to tofu.  The text of the proposed law contains several exemptions, including foods that are certified organic, contain only small amounts of genetically engineered material, or are sold for immediate consumption, like at a restaurant.
Proponents, largely big natural food companies and consumers passionate about organic food, have raised $2.8 million as of the mid-August reporting deadline.  According to the committees backing Prop 37, the movement started a "grandmother from Chico" woke up and decided it was her duty to lead the grassroots effort to label genetically modified foods. Since then, individual small donors have joined the cause, enough to attract the attention and support of big-money backers like Dr. Joseph Mercola, who runs a popular alternative health website.   Other major donors include the Organic Consumers Fund, Dr. Bronner's Magic Soaps, Nature's Path Foods, and Lundberg Family Farms.

Opponents, as of the same filing deadline, have raised nine times as much money. Almost all of the nearly $25 million has come from a variety of chemical, seed and processed-food companies, including Coca-Cola, General Mills, Nestle, PepsiCo, DuPont Pioneer, the Grocery Manufacturers Association, Council for Biotechnology Information, and a number of chambers of commerce and other business groups and biotech organizations.

Voting YES on Prop 37 means you want genetically engineered foods and food products to be labeled in California.  Voting NO would mean no change to existing law. No labeling would be required.
Proponents argue labeling will allow consumers to know which foods have genetically engineered material so they can decide for themselves whether to eat them.  Having such information could help consumers protect themselves and their family, as some physicians and scientists claim such foods are linked to allergies and other health risks.  More than 40 other nations currently require such labeling, including "most of Europe, Japan, and even China and India."  Proponents contend it will cost nothing to include this information on a label because manufacturers will have time to phase in new labels, or decide to change their products to avoid the labeling requirement.  Finally, Prop 37 will prevent the misleading use of the word "natural" on genetically engineered foods.

Opponents argue Prop 37 will add more government bureaucracy and increase taxpayer costs because of the need to monitor "tens of thousands of food labels."  It will lead to more lawsuits and create "a new class of 'headhunter lawsuits' allowing lawyers to sue family farmers and grocers without any proof of harm."  Prop 37 will increase food costs by billions as farmers and food companies are forced to implement "costly new operations" or switch to the more expensive, non-genetically engineered foods, a cost that will ultimately be passed on to consumers.  Prop 37 is full of special-interest exemptions, including milk and dairy products, alcohol, and meat.  Lastly, opponents argue scientific and medical organizations have concluded biotech (GMO) foods are safe, including the National Academy of Sciences, American Council on Science and Health, Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, and the World Health Organization.
According to the legislative analyst's office (“LAO”), the cost to the State of administering the proposed labeling program could be as much as $1 million a year, because the Department of Public Health would have to monitor food producers to evaluate compliance. The LAO also predicts an unknown but "potentially significant" cost for the courts, the Attorney General, and district attorneys to handle lawsuits arising from violations.

Why?  The proffered statute contains what is commonly referred to as a “bounty hunter” provision, allowing trial lawyers to file lawsuits against alleged violators alleging labeling violations, but requires no proof of any damages prior to filing the lawsuit.  According to the LAO, lawyers can file suit “without needing to demonstrate that any specific damage occurred as a result of the alleged violation.”  This provision potentially undermines Proposition 64, passed by voters in 2004, which changed the law to require that attorneys actually have a client or injured party before filing a lawsuit.  Prop 37 requires no client, or proof of damage to sue under the measure.
Questions?  Concerns about how pending legislation or litigation may impact your business?  Comment, or send me an email, and let’s discuss. 

Nothing in this blog is intended to create an attorney-client relationship.  This article is intended to provide a general overview of the current status of the law for informational purposes only, and is not intended to constitute, or serve as a substitute for, a professional legal consultation.  Laws change every day; please consult an attorney regarding the current status of the law, and how the law affects your specific circumstances. Thank you.

 

Thursday, August 23, 2012

Litigation News


As the kids head back to school, we plan our final Labor Day weekend getaways, and brace ourselves for the fall, here’s some information on a few cases that heated up over the summer months that did not receive a lot of media attention, but piqued my interest.

In California:

On July 31st, a state appeals court reinstated a lawsuit against Glock, Inc., a well-known gun manufacturer, filed by a Los Angeles policeman paralyzed from the waist down when his 3-year-old son shot him with his service pistol.  The lawsuit alleges the Glock 21 had inadequate safeguards against accidental discharge, because it had a “light trigger pull” and did not have a grip safety, a device attached to the pistol grip the shooter must deactivate before firing.

While off duty in 2006, Chavez was called to report to testify in court, and put his son in the backseat of his vehicle, so he could drop the boy off at his grandfather’s home.  Chavez forgot he had his loaded Glock beneath the front seat.  Less than ten minutes into the drive, the child picked up the pistol and shot his father in the back.

The lawsuit against Glock was dismissed two years ago, after a Los Angeles judge, Judge Kevin Brazile, concluded after hearing expert testimony that the advantages to the gun’s design outweighed any inherent risks. The judge also ruled the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate an alternative design would have prevented the shooting.

In overturning the dismissal, the Second District Court of Appeal, in a 3-0 ruling, held there was a factual dispute, and enough evidence that a jury could have concluded the grip safety  was strong enough to prevent a 3-year-old from firing the weapon, thus minimizing “the risk of accidental discharge without undermining performance.”  The case was remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

In the U.S. Supreme Court:

The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the 1st amendment barred an employment discrimination lawsuit by a terminated employee (and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission) when the employer was a religious organization, and the employee one of its ministers.  After a thorough evaluation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause, the Court ruled such lawsuits were, in fact, barred.

In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 US ____ (2012), the Church operated a small elementary school.  The employee was a teacher at the school, and was a commissioned minister by the Church.  She received a special housing allowance on her income taxes because her activities were “in the exercise of ministry.”  After requesting disability accommodations from the school, she threatened to take legal action.  The Church responded to the threat by rescinding the employee’s call to the ministry and terminating her employment, citing her insubordination and disruptive behavior among other things.

The EEOC sued the Church, alleging retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit, and sought reinstatement, back-pay, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and other relief.  The Church moved for summary judgment, claiming the lawsuit was barred by the First Amendment and the ministerial exception:  an exception to the application of employment discrimination statutes to religious organizations and their “ministerial” employees.

The District Court granted summary judgment; the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, vacated the decision and remanded, ruling the ministerial exception did not apply because her primary function as a school teacher was not religious in nature.  Her claim would not require the court to analyze church doctrine.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Chief Justice Roberts authored the unanimous decision; the Supreme Court’s first consideration of the ministerial exception.  His review of the history of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment started with the Magna Carta in 1215.  Suffice it to say, it’s an interesting read for any history buff.  The Court concluded by agreeing a ministerial exception does exist, and that it precludes application of employment discrimination legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.  The exception is to be broadly interpreted to include religious organization employees in addition to ministers and religious teachers.  Not all claims were strictly foreclosed by this decision, however, leaving some situations still open to argument; including breach of contract or some vaguely described “tortious conduct” by the employer.

 
Questions?  Concerns about how pending lawsuits or legislation may impact your business?  Comment, or send me an email or call, and let’s discuss. 


Nothing in this blog is intended to create an attorney-client relationship.  This article is intended to provide a general overview of the current status of the law for informational purposes only, and is not intended to constitute, or serve as a substitute for, a professional legal consultation.  Laws change every day; please consult an attorney regarding the current status of the law, and how the law affects your specific circumstances. Thank you.

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

Do Changes to California’s Mechanic’s Lien Laws, effective July 1, 2012, Affect You?

Although many changes to the mechanic’s lien law statutes go into effect July 1, 2012, a lot of the changes are legal, technical changes that will affect lawyers fighting for your rights in the courtroom, but may not significantly affect how you the contractor do business in the real world.  This article will explain the changes, and what, if anything, you need to do to implement those changes in your business office.

First and foremost, the mandatory forms of conditional and unconditional waivers have been revised and renumbered.  The governing statutes now are as follows:

            1.         Conditional Waiver and Release Upon Progress Payment:  Civil Code § 8132 (formerly Civil Code § 3262(d)(1));
            2.         Unconditional Waiver and Release Upon Progress Payment:  Civil Code § 8134 (formerly Civil Code § 3262(d)(2));
            3.         Conditional Waiver and Release Upon Final Payment:  Civil Code § 8136 (formerly Civil Code § 3262(d)(3)); and
            4.         Unconditional Waiver and Release Upon Final Payment:  Civil Code § 8138 (formerly Civil Code § 3262(d)(4)).

The revised language of these releases can literally be cut and pasted out of the statute and into your form, or you can email the author at Kristine@MollenkopfLawGroup.com for new forms.  Legislative notes describing the reason for these changes indicate they are being “recast for clarity,” but should not be considered a “substantive change.”  Case law interpreting the former Section 3262 will continue to be used to interpret these “new” statutes.

Next, there are new service requirements, and changes to the language for preliminary notices for private works of improvement.  (See Civil Code §§ 8200(a)(3) and 8202(a)(3).)  Section 8200(a)(3) now requires the subcontractor to serve not only the owner and prime contractor with the preliminary notice, but also the construction lender, or reputed construction lender, if any.  If you have been attending the author’s mechanic’s lien seminars, then you know she has always recommended service upon the construction lender, so if you implemented that advice, this new requirement should not be a substantive change for your business office.

Section 8202 revises the “Notice to Property Owner” section of the preliminary notice.  Otherwise, the preliminary notice must continue to comply with the requirements of Section 8102 with which you are all familiar (e.g., providing the name and address of the owner, direct contractor, and construction lender, a description of the site sufficient for identification, the name, address, and relationship to the parties of the person giving the notice, a general statement of the work provided, the name of the person to or for whom the work is provided, and a statement or estimate of the demand, if any, after deducting all just credits and offsets).  Again, this language can be cut and pasted out of the statutes into your form, or you can email the author at Kristine@MollenkopfLawGroup.com for a revised form.

Carried over from changes that became effective over a year ago on January 1, 2011, is the requirement that all mechanic’s liens must be accompanied by a “Notice of Mechanic’s Lien” containing the required language giving notice to the owner of the import of the document.  The legislature has again been very helpful, and provided the specific, required language of that notice, which may be cut and pasted out of the statute and into your form.  Or, you guessed it…email the author for the mechanic’s lien form and required notice to owner.  The mechanic’s lien now will be rejected by the Recorder’s Office unless also accompanied by a proof of service of the lien upon the property owner (also part of the form), and as has always been the case, failure to comply with the notice provisions of the statute render the lien invalid.

On the other hand, an error in the claim of lien (i.e., such as errors in the demand, credits, and offsets deducted; the work provided; or the description of the site) will not invalidate the lien, pursuant to Civil Code § 8422(a), (b), which codified existing case law.  However, these types of errors will render the lien invalid if a court determines the claim of lien was (1) made with the intent to defraud or to slander title, or (2) an innocent third party, without notice, became the bona fide owner of the property after recordation of the claim of lien, and the claim of lien was so deficient that it did not put that third party on further inquiry of the matter.  This new section generally combined the substance of former Sections 3118 and 3261, but expanded the bases for invalidity to include intentional slander of title.

If a subcontractor improperly records a mechanic’s lien or it becomes stale due to lack of perfection, but the subcontractor then refuses to voluntarily release the lien, an owner may file a motion to expunge the lien.  In the past, the owner was limited to recovery of $2,000 worth of attorney fees toward that effort.  Now, with the new Civil Code § 8488(c), the cap on attorney fees is lifted, and a prevailing owner may recover all of her reasonable attorney fees in connection with the action.  This is further reason (in case the risk of CSLB discipline wasn’t enough) for contractors to voluntarily withdraw expired or improperly recorded liens.

In this time of foreclosures and short sales, another provision to be aware of is Civil Code § 8494.  This section essentially codified existing case law, and provides that if a claim of lien expires for failure to file a foreclosure action, or if a court order or judgment is recorded expunging a lien, the claim of lien does not constitute actual or constructive notice of any of the matters contained, claimed, alleged, or contended in the claim of lien, or create a duty of inquiry in any person thereafter dealing with the affected property.  In other words, the subsequent purchaser does not take title subject to the mechanic’s lien interest.

Relative to the priority of liens, Civil Code § 8456 benefits construction lenders, providing that as long as the total amount of optional advances does not exceed the original amount of the construction loan, the optional advances will relate back to the date of the recordation of the construction deed of trust.  Provided the original construction deed of trust was recorded before the commencement of construction, then the optional advances will also enjoy priority over (i.e., be senior to) any mechanic’s liens.

Also on the mechanic’s lien front, Civil Code § 8424(d) now makes lien release bonds more affordable.  The amount of the bond required to release a lien has been reduced from 150% to 125% of the lien amount. This harmonizes the required amount of a lien release bond with the required amount of a stop payment notice release bond.

This brings us to a largely nonsubstantive, vocabulary change.  The term “stop notice” has been replaced with “stop payment notice” (Civil Code § 8044).  The term “original contractor” has been replaced with “direct contractor”  (Civil Code § 8018).  Finally, the term “materialman” has been replaced with “material supplier” (Civil Code § 8028).  Just when you thought you had it all figured out.

The legislature also redefined “completion” as it relates to private works of improvement, with the enactment of Civil Code § 8180(a).  Currently, acceptance by the owner is deemed “completion” for purposes of establishing the deadline for recording a mechanic’s lien.  The new statute has removed acceptance by the owner as an act of completion, but maintains the other statutorily provided completion equivalents:  (1) actual completion of the work of improvement; (2) occupation or use by the owner accompanied by cessation of labor; (3) cessation of labor for a continuous period of 60 days; (4) recordation of a notice of cessation after cessation of labor for a continuous period of 30 days. 

“Completion” has not been redefined in this manner relative to public works of improvement; therefore, a project is not deemed completed unless accepted as complete by the public entity.  However, with respect to completion equivalents, Civil Code § 9200(b) extends the period of continuous cessation of labor necessary to constitute completion from 30 days to 60 days.  Note this equivalent does not apply to public works of improvement for state agencies, however.

The period within which owners “may” record notices of completion has been extended from 10 days to 15 days following completion, for both private and public works of improvement.  (Civil Code §§ 8182(a) [private], 9204(a) [public].)  Also, for private works of improvement in which the scopes of work are being performed under separate direct contracts with the owner, the owner may now record individual notices of completion relative to the completion of each scope of work.  (Civil Code § 8186(a).)  This is an important event to monitor, as it will affect the contractor’s deadline relative to recordation of its mechanic’s lien and the making of bond claims.

Now, a few items that may make your life as a contractor a bit easier.  Pursuant to Civil Code § 8210, owners must now provide all parties who served the owner with a preliminary notice the name and address of any construction lender who makea a post-commencement construction loan to the project.  Also, for all construction contracts after July 1, 2012, the contract must provide a space for the owner to identify any construction lender (excepting home improvement or pool contracts).  (Civil Code § 8170(b).)  Please note, however, the failure to list a construction lender pursuant to this section does not relieve the contractor from any preliminary notice requirements to that construction lender.  A contractor, as part of his due diligence, must still search the County Recorder’s records to identify any construction lenders of record prior to the commencement of construction.

For any design professionals out there, landscape architects have been added as a “design professional” entitled to assert a design professional lien.  (Civil Code § 8014.)  Also, under existing law, design professional liens were extinguished upon commencement of the work.  Now, pursuant to Civil Code § 8319, design professionals can convert their design professional liens into mechanic’s liens if all of the conditions of the statute are met.

As always, if you have any questions about these changes, or how they may affect your business, please do not hesitate to call or email!

Nothing in this blog is intended to create an attorney-client relationship.  This article is intended to provide a general overview of the current status of the law for informational purposes only, and is not intended to constitute, or serve as a substitute for, a professional legal consultation.  Laws change every day; please consult an attorney regarding the current status of the law, and how the law affects your specific circumstances. Thank you.

Friday, March 23, 2012

Turnkey Schools of America execs plead no contest

For those of you who remember or have been following the Turnkey Schools of America debaucle involving the Santa Maria Bonita School District, you may find this article of interest:

http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/mar/22/ex-construction-execs-plead-no-contest-in-school-f/